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1 Introduction
In a recent issue of this journal, Boue¨t (2001) offers a contribution to the literature dealing
with the implication of quantitative restrictions in international oligopolies. The main result of
the paper is that ”When the R-D investment has uncertain consequences on marginal cost, a
voluntary export restriction (VER) decreases innovation by the domestic producer as compared
to the free trade level. This result holds both under Cournot and Bertrand competition” (p.323).
The aim of the present note is to show that, contrary to the author’s claim, the qualitative
impact of the VER on R-D investment does depend on the mode of market competition in his
model. In order to show this, we provide a counter-example that makes use of the linear example
developed by Boue¨t (2001) and solve it for Bertrand competition (instead of Cournot). In this
case, a VER increases R-D expenses (instead of decreasing it under Cournot), i.e. depending
on the mode of competition, the implication of the VER on the R-D investment are reversed.
Before we proceed to the analysis of the example, let us summarize the main intuition
underlying Boue¨t’s original result.
• Think of a domestic firm (denoted N, for Northern) being challenged in its domestic market
by a foreign one (denoted S, for Southern). Firm S produces at low marginal cost. Before
entry takes place, firm N may invest in R-D. If the R-D program is successful, N produces
at low marginal cost whereas if it is not successful, the domestic firm produces at a higher
marginal cost and is therefore less competitive than the foreign entrant. The motivation
for R-D expenses results from its impact on the profits at the competition stage: domestic
profits are larger if its marginal cost is lower.
• The outcome of the R-D activity is uncertain but by investing more, firm N increases
the probability of a success. In equilibrium, the optimal R-D investment level reflects the
trade-off between higher R-D sunk costs and increased prospects for the high profits that
are associated with the market game with low cost.
• Suppose now that the game is altered in a way such that N payoffs increases in the case
of an unsuccessful R-D activity but is not affected in the case of a successful program.
Since the domestic payoff in case of failure has increased while being unaffected in case of
success, the marginal value of R-D investment has decreased, so that firm N invests less
in equilibrium.
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Boue¨t shows first that, under Cournot competition, a VER which is binding in case of unsuc-
cesfull program and not binding otherwise, has precisely the implication alluded to here above.
Accordingly ”Sourthern firm’s VER may be exchanged against less Research and Development
from the Northern firm”(p.324) He then claims that a similar result obtains under Bertrand.
We show hereafter that this last conclusion is certainly not true in general, precisely because, a
quota set above the Free Trade level is very likely to be effective (as shown by Krishna (1989)).
2 The Counterexample
Let us consider the linear example developed in Boue¨t (2001). Market demand is given by
p = a− (qN + qS). We assume herafter that a = 10. Firm S faces a marginal cost cN = 3. Firm
N faces a marginal cost ch = 9 if the R-D activity is not successful and a marginal cost cl = 3
if it is successful. The probability of a successful R-D activity is equal to
√
r where r is the
investment decision. We assume that firms compete in prices.
In order to study the R-D investment decision, we solve first the two possible price subgames:
the ”unsuccessful R-D game” (denoted UG) and the”successful R-D game” (denoted SG), and
then go backward.
• In UG, the foreign firm benefits from an absolute cost advantage. Under Bertrand compe-
tition, the Nash equilibrium sees the low cost firm either playing its monopoly strategy or
naming a price that just undercuts the high cost firm. Under our particular parametriza-
tion, the monopoly solution is feasible: the foreign firm names pS = 5 while the domestic
firm names pN = 9. The domestic firm therefore nets zero profits in UG.
• In the SG, the two firms enjoy identical constant marginal costs. The unique Nash equi-
librium in this case is (3, 3). The two firms share the market evenly and both make zero
profits.
• Having solved the two possible price subgames, we note that the domestic firm nets zero
profits in both cases. R-D investment is therefore purposeless and the optimal decision is
r = 0 under free trade.
Consider now the introduction of a VER, that is set exactly at the level of demand faced by
the foreign firm in UG, i.e. V ER = 5, as proposed in Boue¨t (2001, section 7).
• Even though this VER is apparently not binding in the SG, it alters the whole game, so
that a new equilibrium emerges. Under Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods,
a quantity restriction, imposed on one firm only, and set below the competitive market
demand level ensures positive equilibrium payoffs to both firms (see Levitan and Shubik
(1972) for a theoretical treatment particularily well-suited for the present analysis). By
way of consequence, the introduction of the VER at a level of 5 yields positive payoffs for
the domestic firm in SG. The particular form of the (mixed strategy) equilibrium and the
level of the payoffs will depend on the exact specification of the rationing rule at work in
the market. A closed-form solution of such games is not necessary for our present purpose
(see Levitan and Shubik (1972)). We only need to know that πSGN > 0.
• UG is formally equivalent a pricing game where one firm faces a capacity constraint and
where unit costs differ. Again, obtaining closed-form solutions for such game is not trivial
(see Deneckere and Kovenock (1996)). However, it the present case, the cost differential is
so large that as long as we consider VER at or sufficiently close to 5, the monopoly equi-
librium (possibly constrained) remains feasible. Accordingly, the domestic firm’s payoffs
is not affected.
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• Having solved the two subgames we can now go backward in the game tree. Since the
domestic firm’s payoff in SG has increased, relative to free trade whereas it is unaffected
in UG, firm N is more prone to invest in R-D than under free trade.
It is not necessary to compute the optimal R-D investment level to see that the presence
of the VER alters the domestic firm’s incentives in a direction that is exactly the opposite to
what happens under Cournot competition: In our example, the introduction of the VER tends
to increases R-D expenses!
3 Comments
The previous example looks rather extreme because under free trade the domestic firm never
finds it optimal to invest in R-D. Note however that it cannot be viewed as ”pathological”
since it is a counterpart to the example considered in Boue¨t (2001) to illustrate his result under
Cournot. The assumption of homogeneous goods greatly simplifies the analysis. The natural
question then is: should we expect a similar result to hold under product differentiation? The
answer is clearly yes.
The keypoint for obtaining our result is indeed that the domestic firm payoffs in case of a
successful innovation increases due to the presence of the quota. Whenever this is the case,
the argument used in Boue¨t for establishing his main result (the fact that a marginal value of
R-D investment decreases because domestic payoff in SG is not affected by the VER) cannot be
invoked. This is not to say that a VER will never lead to a decrease in R-D effort under price
competition. It is very likely in fact that this is so for many parameters constellations involving
differentiated products. What should be stressed however is that because we are considering a
VER, the case of price competition is intrinsically different from the case of quantity competition:
the basic feature of the VER in a Cournot game is that it is not effective if set above the Free
Trade equilibrium level whereas the basic feature of a VER under Bertrand competition is that
it is effective even if set above the Free Trade equilibrium level. Accordingly, if some result
obtained under Cournot competition crucially depends on the fact that the VER is binding or
not relative to the Free Trade benchmark, we should not expect that it naturally extends to
Bertrand competition. Stated differently, what makes Boue¨t’s argument fully compelling under
Cournot competition is also what makes it not under Bertrand. This is deeply rooted in the
very nature of VER, i.e. the fact that it acts like a capacity constraint.
This conclusion is not too surprising since it is a direct implication of Krishna (1989)’s pa-
per. Her main contribution in this paper is to show why a quota has very different implications
depending on the mode of competition. Fairly enough however, very few papers elaborated on
Krishna’s original idea by dealing explicitely with price competition in the presence of export
restrictions. In particular, almost all papers dealing with the possible impact of quotas in early
stages of oligopoly games (where firms commit to strategic variables such as products’ char-
acteristics, or R-D) retained a Cournot framework for the analysis of the market competition
stage. Accordingly, the key issue raised by Krishna has been progressively overlooked. New ma-
terial aimed at improving our understanding of price competition in the presence of quantitative
restrictions and product differentiation seems to be called for.
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